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Abstract 
In the research literature on white-collar crime, there seems to be a tendency to claim 
individual failure rather than systems failure. Occupational crime is often emphasized at the 
expense of corporate crime. In the research literature on misconduct and crime by police 
officers, however, there seems to be a tendency to claim systems failure. It is argued that 
police crime is a result of bad practice, lack of resources or mismanagement, rather than acts 
of criminals. Based on two empirical studies in Norway of business and police crime, this 
paper is concerned with the extent to which the rotten apple theory versus the rotten barrel 
theory can explain crime in business organizations and police organizations.  
 
 
Keywords: rotten-apple theory; rotten barrel theory; business crime; police crime; empirical 
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White-Collar Crime and Police Crime: 
Rotten Apples or Rotten Barrels? 
 
 
Introduction 
Ashforth et al. (2008) argue that it is comforting to assume that one bad apple or renegade 
faction within an organization is somewhat responsible for the crime we too often observe. 
However, organizations are important to our understanding of crime, because they influence 
the actions of their members. Therefore, both micro and macro views are important to 
understand crime. 
In this paper, results from empirical study of two different kinds of organizations are 
presented. First, white-collar crime is defined as financial crime committed by white-collar 
criminals. Thus, the definition includes characteristics of the crime as well as the criminal. 
The rotten apple view of white-collar crime is a comfortable perspective to adopt for business 
organizations as it allows them to look no further than suspect individuals.  It is only when 
other forms of group (O’Connor, 2005) and/or systemic (Punch, 2003) corruption and other 
kinds of crime erupt upon a business enterprise that a more critical look is taken of white-
collar criminality. This rotten apple view of white-collar crime is a comfortable perspective to 
adopt for business organizations as it allows them to look no further than suspect individuals.  
It is only when other forms of group (O’Connor, 2005) and/or systemic (Punch, 2003) 
corruption and other kinds of crime erupt upon a business enterprise that a more critical look 
is taken of white-collar criminality. 
Second, police crime is defined as intentional crime committed by police organization 
employees on duty. Police crime tends to be discovered when investigating police complaints 
and whistle blowing. Policing police crime is defined as enforcing law on potential and actual 
criminal employees in the police organization (Seneviratne, 2004). According to the United 
Nations (UNODC, 2006), the great majority of individuals involved in policing is committed 
to honorable and competent public service and is consistently demonstrating high standards 
of personal and procedural integrity in performing their duties. However, when serious 
misconduct occurs there seems to be a tendency to consider police crime as a result of bad 
practice, lack of resources or mismanagement, rather than acts of criminals. Unfortunately, 
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examples illustrate that criminal acts are intentionally carried out by police officers on duty. 
Police crime does not only occur in countries such as Mexico (Davis, 2007) and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Maljevic et al., 2008). It is found in the UK (Porter and Warrender, 2009), 
USA (Klockars et al., 2006), Australia (OPI, 2008) and Norway (Gottschalk, 2010) as well - 
although on a smaller scale.  
While the literature on white-collar crime tends to support the rotten apple theory, the 
literature on police crime tends to support the rotten barrel theory. This discrepancy is the 
issue to be explored both theoretically and empirically in the following article.  
  
White-Collar Crime 
White-collar crime can be defined in terms of the offense, the offender or both. If white-
collar crime is defined in terms of the offense, it means crime against property for personal or 
organizational gain. It is a property crime committed by non-physical means and by 
concealment or deception (Benson and Simpson, 2009). If white-collar crime is defined in 
terms of the offender, it means crime committed by upper class members of society for 
personal or organizational gain. It is individuals who are wealthy, highly educated, and 
socially connected, and they are typically employed by and in legitimate organizations 
(Hansen, 2009). 
White-collar crime can be classified into categories as illustrated in Figure 1. There are two 
dimensions in the table. First, a distinction is made between leader and follower. This 
distinction supported by Bucy et al. (2008), who found that motives for leaders are different 
from follower motives. Compared to the view that leaders engage in white-collar crime 
because of greed, followers are non-assertive, weak people who trail behind someone else, 
even into criminal schemes. Followers may be convinced of the rightness of their cause, and 
they believe that no harm can come to them because they are following a leader whom they 
trust or fear. Followers tend to be naive and unaware of what is really happening, or they are 
simply taken in by the personal charisma of the leader and are intensely loyal to that person.   
Next, a distinction is made between occupational crime and corporate crime in Figure 1. 
Largely individuals or small groups in connection with their jobs commit occupational crime. 
It includes embezzling from an employer, theft of merchandise, income tax evasion, and 
manipulation of sales, fraud, and violations in the sale of securities (Bookman, 2008). 
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Occupational crime is sometimes labeled elite crime Hansen (2009) argues that the problem 
with occupational crime is that it is committed within the confines of positions of trust and in 
organizations, which prohibits surveillance and accountability. Heath (2008) found that the 
bigger and more severe occupational crime tends to be committed by individuals who are 
further up the chain of command in the firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Categories of white-collar crime depending on role and actor 
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commission of a crime against the corporation, it is occupational crime. A corporation cannot 
be jailed, and therefore, the majority of penalties to control individual violators are not 
available for corporations and corporate crime (Bookman, 2008). 
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to expand the panoply of corporate crime in order to deter conduct ranging from 
reprehensible, to undesirable, to merely annoying. In the context of organizational behavior, 
criminal law is the ultimate deterrent. 
Corporations become victims of crime when they suffer a loss as a result of an offense 
committed by a third party, including employees and managers. Corporations become 
perpetrators of crime when managers or employees commit financial crime within the context 
of a legal organization. According to Garoupa (2007), corporations can more easily corrupt 
enforcers, regulators and judges, as compared to individuals. Corporations are better 
organized, are wealthier and benefit from economies of scale in corruption. Corporations are 
better placed to manipulate politicians and the media. By making use of large grants, 
generous campaign contributions and influential lobbying organizations, they may push law 
changes and legal reforms that benefit their illegal activities. 
Occupational crime is typically motivated by greed, where white-collar criminals seek to 
enrich themselves personally. Similarly, firms engage in corporate crime to improve their 
financial performance. Employees break the law in ways that enhance the profits of the firm, 
but which may generate very little or no personal benefit for themselves when committing 
corporate crime (Heath, 2008: 600): 
There is an important difference, for instance, between the crimes committed at Enron by 
Andrew Fastow, who secretly enriched himself at the expense of the firm, and those 
committed by Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, who for the most part acted in ways that 
enriched the firm, and themselves only indirectly (via high stock price). 
While legal corporations may commit business crime, illegal organizations are in the business 
of committing crime. Garoupa (2007) emphasized the following differences between 
organized crime and business crime (i) organized crime is carried out by illegal firms (with 
no legal status), the criminal market being their primary market and legitimate markets 
secondary markets, (ii) corporate crime is carried out by legal firms (with legal status), the 
legitimate market being their primary market and the criminal market their secondary market. 
Whereas organized crime exists to capitalize on criminal rents and illegal activities, 
corporations do not exist to violate the law. Organized crime gets into legitimate markets in 
order to improve its standing on the criminal market, while corporations violate the law so as 
to improve their standing on legitimate markets. 
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Criminal opportunities are now recognized as an important cause of all crime. Without an 
opportunity, there cannot be a crime. Opportunities are important causes of white-collar 
crime, where the opportunity structures may be different from those of other kinds of crime. 
These differences create special difficulties for control, but they also provide new openings 
for control (Benson and Simpson, 2009). 
 
White-Collar Apples or Barrels 
While occupational crime is associated with bad apples, corporate crime is associated with 
systems failure. Bad apples theory represents an individualistic approach in criminology, 
while systems failure theory represents a business approach in criminology (Heath, 2008: 
601): 
If the individualistic approach were correct, then one would expect to find a fairly random 
distribution of white collar crime throughout various sectors of the economy, depending upon 
where individuals suffering from poor character or excess greed wound up working. Yet, 
what one finds instead are very high concentrations of criminal activity in particular sectors of 
the economy. Furthermore, these pockets of crime often persist quite stubbornly over time, 
despite a complete changeover in the personnel involved. 
It is certainly an interesting issue whether to view white-collar misconduct and crime as acts 
of individuals perceived as 'rotten apples' or as an indication of systems failure in the 
company, the industry or the society as a whole. The perspective of occupational crime is 
favoring the individualistic model of deviance, which is a human failure model of misconduct 
and crime. This rotten apple view of white-collar crime is a comfortable perspective to adopt 
for business organizations as it allows them to look no further than suspect individuals.  It is 
only when other forms of group (O’Connor, 2005) and/or systemic (Punch, 2003) corruption 
and other kinds of crime erupt upon a business enterprise that a more critical look is taken of 
white-collar criminality. Furthermore, when serious misconduct occurs and is repeated, there 
seems to be a tendency to consider crime as a result of bad practice, lack of resources or 
mismanagement, rather than acts of criminals. 
The 'rotten apple' metaphor has been extended to include the group level view of cultural 
deviance in organizations with a ‘rotten barrel’ metaphor (O’Connor, 2005). Furthermore, 
Punch (2003) has pushed the notion of 'rotten orchards' to highlight deviance at the systemic 
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level. Punch (2003:172) notes, "the metaphor of 'rotten orchards' indicate(s) that it is 
sometimes not the apple, or even the barrel, that is rotten but the system (or significant parts 
of the system)".  
Including rotten apple and rotten barrel in Figure 2 expands Figure 1. 
White-collar crime involves some form of social deviance and represents a breakdown in 
social order. According to Heath (2008), white-collar criminals tend to apply techniques of 
neutralization used by offenders to deny the criminality of their actions. Examples of 
neutralization techniques are (a) denial of responsibility, (b) denial of injury, (c) denial of the 
victim, (d) condemnation of the condemners, (e) appeal to higher loyalties, (f) everyone else 
is doing it, and (g) claim to entitlement. The offender may claim an entitlement to act as he 
did, either because he was subject to a moral obligation, or because of some misdeed 
perpetrated by the victim. These excuses are applied both for occupational crime and for 
corporate crime at both the rotten apple level and the rotten barrel level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Categories of white-collar crime depending on role, actor and level 
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may have acted under obedience pressure. Baird and Zellin (2009) conducted such a study, 
where they utilized written scenarios to examine whether persons committing fraud in 
situations involving obedience pressure are judged less harshly by others than persons 
committing fraud of their own volition. Participants in their study were also asked how likely 
they would be, in the same circumstances, to commit the same fraudulent acts, with higher 
expectations predicted for participants receiving the scenarios involving obedience pressure. 
In their study, they found empirical support for the hypothesis that followers from obedience 
pressure are less harshly judged. 
 
Police Crime 
There is a debate in the research literature whether to view police misconduct and crime as 
acts of individuals perceived as 'rotten apples' or as an indication of systems failure in the 
police force (Perry, 2001; Johnson, 2003; Punch, 2003; Tiffen, 2004; O'Connor, 2005; Iomo 
et al., 2009; Porter and Warrender, 2009). Some researchers are favoring the individualistic 
model of police deviance, which is a human failure model of misconduct and crime. This 
rotten apple view of police crime is a comfortable perspective to adopt for police 
organizations as it allows them to look no further than suspect individuals.  It is only when 
other forms of group (O’Connor, 2005) and/or systemic (Punch, 2003) corruption and other 
kinds of crime erupt upon a police service that a more critical look is taken of police 
criminality. When serious misconduct occurs and is repeated, there seems to be a tendency to 
consider police crime as a result of bad practice, lack of resources or mismanagement, rather 
than acts of criminals. 
Porter and Warrender (2009) phrased the question: Why do officers commit police deviance? 
An early answer to this question was that so-called bad apples commit corruption or rotten 
apples, that is, corrupt individuals committing corruption for personal gain. A later answer, 
however, was that corruption is due to group behavior that is rooted within established 
practices in the police force into which officers have to be initiated.  
In New South Wales in Australia, the issue of police corruption has been on political and 
media agendas for more than three decades. According to Tiffen (2004), the media reporting 
has included some landmark pieces of investigative reporting and dramatic revelations in 
trials and royal commissions but also sensationalism and rhetoric extravagance. Despite the 
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prolonged attention and prolific coverage, serious questions remain about how well the extent 
and nature of corruption was reported and whether the media has conveyed the degree of 
reform in police practices. 
The economic side of corruption in New South Wales was concerned with the progress 
beyond individual rotten apples into institutionalized corruption. The most prolific areas for 
institutionalized police corruption were the enforcement of 'victimless crime', including 
abortion, prostitution, illegal drugs, illegal gambling, restrictions on alcohol consumption, 
and homosexuality. They are areas where there is a strong constituency, often religious, that 
seeks to enforce personal moral standards through legislation but where outlawing the 
activity or substance does not stop the demand for it (Tiffen, 2004). 
In a study in the USA, Ioimo et al. (2009) found that black and white citizens, as well as 
black and white officers, have differing views on bias-based policing issues. Two questions 
on the police officer questionnaire and one question on the citizen questionnaire addressed 
the presence of bias-based policing in Virginia police departments. When asked if they 
believed that any Virginia police department officially supports bias-based policing, 12% of 
responding officers answered 'yes'. This is an interesting finding, because it questions the 
'rotten-apple' theory and provides potential support for the 'systems failure' theory.  
In Japan, the problem of police corruption is not necessarily so much a matter of a few 'rotten 
apples' as more a matter of a failed organization. Johnson (2003) argues that significant 
reform requires conditions that now are absent and seem unlikely to emerge anytime soon. 
For the foreseeable future, Japanese police seem likely to remain above the law, he argues. 
 
Police Apples or Barrels 
The 'rotten apple' metaphor has been extended to include the group level view of police 
cultural deviance with a ‘rotten barrel’ metaphor (O’Connor, 2005). Furthermore, Punch 
(2003) has pushed the notion of 'rotten orchards' to highlight police deviance at the systemic 
level. Punch (2003:172) notes, "the metaphor of 'rotten orchards' indicate(s) that it is 
sometimes not the apple, or even the barrel, that is rotten but the system (or significant parts 
of the system)". That is, deviance that has become systemic is: 
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… in some way encouraged, and perhaps even protected, by certain elements in the system. 
…. “Systems” refers both to the formal system – the police organization, the criminal justice 
system and the broader socio-political context – and to the informal system of deals, 
inducements, collusion and understandings among deviant officers as to how the corruption is 
to be organized, conducted and rationalized.” (Punch, 2003:172) 
These metaphorical extensions represent increasing deeper level meanings associated with 
police crime. For instance, in regard to the 'rotten apple' thesis this level of explanation for 
police deviance is as Perry (2001: 1) notes “…most major inquiries into police corruption 
reject the 'bad-apple' theory: 'the rotten-apple theory won’t work any longer. Corrupt police 
officers are not natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men, constitutionally different 
from their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just 
the apples, the organization, not just the individual in it, because corrupt police are made, not 
born.' ”  
Furthermore, Punch (2003:172) makes the point that “The police themselves often employ 
the 'rotten apple' metaphor – the deviant cop who slips into bad ways and contaminates the 
other essentially good officers – which is an individualistic, human failure model of 
deviance.”  One explanation for favoring this individualistic model of police deviance is 
provided by O’Connor (2005:2) when he states, “Police departments tend to use the rotten 
apple theory… to minimize the public backlash against policing after every exposed act of 
corruption.”        
Hence, it follows according to this individualistic view of police criminality that anti-
corruption strategies should be targeted at finding the 'rotten apples' through measures like 
'integrity testing' (Commission on Police Integrity, 1999), and putting policies and procedures 
in place reduce the opportunity for engaging in misconduct and/or corrupt practices.   
 
Research Methods 
The five hundred and seventeen largest business companies in terms of annual turnover were 
identified in Norway for our empirical study of white-collar crime. A letter was mailed to the 
chief financial officer asking him or her to fill in the questionnaire to be found on a web site 
using a password found in the letter. The research was carried out by a web-based 
questionnaire combined with a letter to the largest business organizations in Norway. 
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65 respondents filled in the questionnaire after the first letter, 45 responses were received 
after a reminder, and another 31 responses were received after a second reminder. Thus, a 
total of 141 complete responses were received. 141 complete responses out of 517 potential 
responses represent a response rate of 27 percent. In addition, 36 incomplete responses were 
received, creating a gross response rate of 34 percent. The survey web site was open to 
responses from January to April in 2010. 
Separate analysis was conducted on the first set of responses, then the second set, and finally 
the third set included. This analysis shows few changes in results when moving from 65 via 
110 to 141 responses. Thus, the analysis suggests that non-respondents might have provided 
similar responses to actual respondents. 
In the police crime study, we used data from court cases in Norway. The Norwegian Bureau 
for the Investigation of Police Affairs prosecutes police officers in court. The Norwegian 
Bureau is similar to police oversight agencies found in other countries, such as the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission in the UK, the Police Department for Internal 
Investigations in Germany, the Inspectorate General of the Internal Administration in 
Portugal, the Standing Police Monitoring Committee in Belgium, the Garda Siochána 
Ombudsman Commission in Ireland, Federal Bureau for Internal Affairs in Austria, and the 
Ministry of the Interior, Police and Security Directorate in Slovenia.  
Since 1988, Norway has a separate system to handle allegations against police officers for 
misconduct. The system was frequently accused of not being independent of regular police 
organizations (Thomassen, 2002). In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament decided to establish a 
separate body to investigate and prosecute cases where employees in the police service or the 
prosecuting authority are suspected of having committed criminal acts in the police service. 
The Norwegian Bureau for the Investigation of Police Affairs has been effective since 
January 2005. The Bureau is mandated to investigate and prosecute cases where employees in 
the police service or the prosecuting authority are accused of having committed criminal acts 
in the service. The Norwegian Bureau has both investigating and prosecuting powers and in 
that way it differs from some comparable European bodies. The Norwegian Bureau does not 
handle complaints from the public concerning allegations of rude or bad behavior that does 
not amount to a criminal offence (Presthus, 2009). 
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Since the operations started at the Norwegian Bureau in January 2005 and until February 
2009, a total of 57 police officers were on trial in Norwegian courts. This was the sample for 
our study. There were 3 prosecuted officers in 2005, 14 in 2006, 16 in 2007, 21 in 2008, and 
3 so far in 2009. 
 
White-Collar Study 
The average number of employees in the 141 business organizations with complete answers 
was 1.719 persons. The largest responding firm in terms of employees had 30.000 persons i 
their staff. 
Respondents were asked to type in their current position, even though the letter was 
specifically mailed to the top executive in charge of finance often called chief financial 
officer (CFO). Most of the respondents were indeed CFOs, but some were CEOs, corporate 
controllers, managers of finance, and chief group controllers. 
The average age among respondents was 48 years among the first 65 responses, and they had 
4.4 years of college and university education on average. The average age decreased to 46 
years when the first reminder responses arrived, while the average education increased to 4.8 
years. There were 91 men and 19 women responding after the first reminding letter. After 
two remainders there were 116 male and 24 female chief financial officers in the sample.  
The average age remained at 46 years after receipt of the final 31 responses, while average 
education continued to increase to 5.1 years. There were 117 men and 24 women among the 
total 141 respondents. The only change, therefore, seems to indicate that higher educated 
persons tend to respond more frequently after reminders.  
There were no direct questions in the survey asking about rotten apples versus rotten barrels. 
Rather, questions were concerned with reasons, suspects, detection, prevention and 
reputation. Many of the questions were open-ended, thereby allowing respondents to answer 
with their own words. Based on content analysis of their responses conducted by several 
researchers, it became obvious that most of the CFOs automatically considered white-collar 
crime to be an issue of rotten apples rather than rotten barrels. 
 
Police Crime Study 
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This research is concerned with bad apples versus systems failure. Therefore, we have to 
identify indicators and combination of indicator values that may suggest a bad apple case or a 
systems failure case. Several independent variables in this study have the potential of 
indicating such a result. 
First and foremost, whistle blowing is an indication that the system finds a criminal act 
unacceptable. If a criminal act were found acceptable in the organization, then whistle 
blowing would be very difficult to carry out for an individual in a system where the 
misconduct is accepted practice.  Therefore, a preliminary result would be that 22 out of 57 
cases represent rotten apples. 
It has been argued that whistle blowing is not common in the police. Most people in 
developed countries are familiar with whistle blowers - people who report corruption, fraud 
and abuse of in their own organizations. Some organizations make whistle blowing very 
difficult and thus less probable. Johnson (2005) found that the police department is one of 
these organizations. She argues that the character of the police department not only makes 
whistle blowing less likely to occur; it ironically makes it even more necessary. In addition, 
she demonstrates that resistance from police departments and their retaliation against 
whistleblowers costs them and the public dearly. 
While whistle blowing might be an indicator of rotten apples cases, it is certainly premature 
to conclude that all 22 whistle blowing cases represent rotten apples. Some of these cases 
may indeed represent systems failure cases. An indicator of systems failure in whistle 
blowing cases might be the motive, where professional motives are more acceptable in the 
system than personal motives. We find only 4 cases where the motive is professional concern 
(1) or efficient police service (2) when at the same time the source is (1) whistle blowing (see 
Appendix). We may deduct these cases and revise our preliminary result by suggesting that 
18 out of 57 cases represent rotten apples.  
We turn now to the cases where the source is (2) external complaints, which might indicate 
rotten apples when occurring with several other independent variables. The independent 
variable issue was selected, which is measured in a dichotomous measure (1) integrity and (2) 
accountability. Integrity is defined as the quality of being honest and morally upright. 
Integrity is sometimes defined as the absence of misconduct, where misconduct is generally 
understood as being an attempt to deceive others by making false statements or omitting 
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important information concerning the work performed, in the results obtained by or the 
sources of the ideas or words used in a work process. According to Cossette (2004), the 
intention to deceive, even if difficult to determine, is a key element in this conception of 
misconduct. Accountability refers to situations in which someone is required or expected to 
justify actions or decisions. It also refers to situations where an officer bears the 
responsibility to someone or for some activity. Accountability has been called "the mother of 
caution", and as such it has a prophylactic and deterrent effect (UNODC, 2006). 
Accountability is a feature of systems, social institutions as well as individuals. It means that 
mechanisms are in place to determine who took responsible action and who is responsible. 
Systems and institutions in which it is impossible to find out who took what action are 
inherently incapable of ethical analysis or ethical action. In this research, we apply the notion 
that integrity is more individual focused, while accountability is more systems focused. 
Therefore, we search for combinations of the source (2) external complaints and the issue (1) 
integrity to identify more rotten apple cases. We identified 15 such cases. 
The sample of potential rotten apples adds up to 33 out of 57 court cases, where 18 cases had 
the source of whistle blowing while 15 cases had the source of external complaint. Since this 
is exploratory research, we conclude that there seems to be more rotten apple cases than 
systems failure cases in the total sample.  
 
Discussion 
The matrix of leader versus follower, rotten apple versus rotten barrel, and occupational 
versus corporate crime provides a useful framework to study white-collar crime. As 
mentioned, content analysis by several researchers revealed that most responding CFOs 
considered white-collar crime to be an issue of rotten apples rather than rotten barrels. 
There was an open-ended question in the questionnaire concerned with challenges of white-
collar crime detection. The question was formulated like this: Why can it be difficult to detect, 
investigate and prosecute white-collar crime?  
Some respondents focused on the offender in their responses. Examples include: 
"This kind of crime is committed by persons who have access to resources and who 
have rich knowledge of the business and know how to hide tracks." 
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"Executives are in charge of control mechanisms and management accounting. When 
they themselves commit financial crime, they manipulate internal control and 
management auditing." 
"Whistle-blowing to the top is risky, since the receiver of the message may be involved 
in the crime." 
Other respondents focused on the offence in their responses. Examples include: 
"You need to get into the details, often single items in an invoice, to be able to detect 
misconduct. Very often it is difficult to find tracks in accounting systems." 
"It takes a long time to detect, so the offender has time to launder tracks." 
"Methods applied by criminal executives become more and more sophisticated." 
A third group of responses focused on shortcomings in control mechanisms. Examples 
include: 
"International trade and transactions with a number of vendors and customers makes 
it extremely difficult for local auditors to follow paths from origin to destination." 
"We live in a society where we trust each other. We are not suspicious enough." 
"Internal control systems are often weak, and there is a lack of rules for top 
management." 
While the white-collar study was based on survey research, the police crime study was based 
on archival analysis of court verdicts. Content analysis of court verdicts searched for 
complaints versus whistle-blowing, where whistle-blowing is interpreted as rotten-apple case 
while complaint is interpreted as rotten-barrel case and thus system failure. Content analysis 
of court cases revealed that most police crime cases are considered to be an issue of rotten 
barrels rather than rotten apples.  
Police officers who witness misconduct are often torn between their duties to reveal the truth 
and help stop criminal behavior, and group pressures to keep silent (Prenzler, 2009: 38): 
The latter pressures can be extremely intense, including octracism, bullying, and even death 
threats. 
The right column in Table 1 indicates whether the case was reported internally by a 
whistleblower or externally by a complainant. 7 out of 21 cases in 2008 were a result of 
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whistle blowing as indicated by a text in the column. Thus empirically, one-third or 33% of 
all court cases against police employees in Norway in 2008 were caused by whistle blowing 
while two-thirds or 67% were caused by complaints as studied previously by Thomassen 
(2002). Whistleblowers reporting about misconduct by their colleagues in the police force are 
the basis for seven court cases out of twenty court cases. Whether this is a low or high 
fraction is hard to conclude, as the researchers know of no similar empirical study. However, 
it might be argued that the six cases in themselves indicate an ability to report misconduct by 
colleagues, as most of the cases do not belong to the most serious categories of crime. 
The total of 21 court cases were in the categories A (physical abuse, 5 cases), B (prisoner 
mistreatment, 2 cases), C (evidence manipulation, no case), D (corruption, 2 cases), E 
(unauthorized disclosure of information, 7 cases), F (extortion, no case), G (sexual 
misconduct, 1 case), and H (others, 4 cases). All cases in category H did have to do with car 
driving. 
The seven whistle blowing cases were in the categories B (prisoner mistreatment, 1 case), D 
(corruption, 2 cases), E (unauthorized disclosure of information, 2 cases), and H (others 
related to car driving, 2 cases). 
 
 
# Offence Motive Sentence Whistleblower 
1 Unauthorized disclosure of 
private security firms list 
currently under investigation 
by the police to TV2 news 
media 
Concern about 
criminal record of 
private security firms 
employees 
21 days 
imprisonment and 
also 1.000 euro 
fine; dismissed 
from police service 
No 
2 Dangerously chasing a stolen 
moped in uniformed police car 
and hitting the rear moped 
wheel with the car, causing 
potential injuries to moped 
driver and passenger 
Stop and catch the 
thief of the stolen 
moped 
500 euro fine, 
alternatively 5 days 
imprisonment 
No 
3 Told an arrested person "you 
are acting like a monkey boy" 
in English, since the prisoner 
was from Kenya and did not 
speak Norwegian 
The prisoner was 
aggressive and the 
police officer did not 
know English very 
well 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
Police colleague 
overheard police officer 
telling an arrested 
prisoner from Kenya 
that " you are acting like 
a monkey boy" 
4 Had stolen from the police 
station two personal 
computers, one video projector 
and one mobile phone 
Intention of using the 
batteries from the 
discarded computers 
in his own computers 
60 days 
imprisonment; 
dismissed from 
police service 
Police colleague 
discovered that 
discarded personal 
computers were 
missing in the office 
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5 Navigating police boat at night 
so that the boat hit ground and 
causing material damage as 
well as personal injuries to 
three passengers including a 
prisoner 
Light onboard was 
turned on, thereby 
reducing the 
navigating officer's 
ability to see in the 
dark 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
No 
6 Threatening persons in letters 
where information from the 
police was revealed 
Had been critiqued 
himself by others and 
had a serious illness 
45 days 
imprisonment and 
1.000 euro to 
victim; dismissed 
from police service 
No 
7 Downloaded information and 
picture of an arrested person 
and gave it to a personal friend 
He gave the 
information to a 
friend to help him 
1.000 euro in fine, 
alternatively 12 
days imprisonment 
No 
8 Sending SMS messages to a 
young girl suggesting sex 
wearing police uniform 
Concerned about the 
girls criminal 
behavior 
45 days 
imprisonment and 
also 1.000 euro 
fine; dismissed 
from police service 
No 
9 Helped illegal immigrant to 
Norway 
The illegal immigrant 
was his wife's sister 
Dismissed from 
police service 
Police colleague notices 
similarity in names of 
illegal immigrant sister 
10 Driving private car at high 
speed to reach a crime scene 
on duty, but causing a traffic 
accident 
Important to arrive 
quickly at the crime 
scene with his police 
dog 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
No 
11 Driving private car at high 
speed to reach a crime scene 
on duty, but causing many 
dangerous situations by 
careless driving 
Important to arrive on 
crime scene in time 
400 euro in fine, 
alternatively 6 days 
imprisonment 
No 
12 Drunken driving in uniformed 
police car 
The officer is an 
alcoholic 
24 days 
imprisonment, and 
a 1.600 euro fine 
Police colleague 
stopped police officer 
while drunken driving 
13 Physical abuse of a suspected 
individual in a restaurant 
Needed to be 
physical to arrest 
person 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
No 
14 Physical abuse of a suspected 
individual during a police 
action against illegal snow 
scooter driving 
Needed to be 
physical to take 
suspect's mobile 
phone 
700 euro in fine, 
alternatively 5 days 
imprisonment 
No 
15 Stolen weapons that were 
handed in to the police 
His intention was to 
buy the weapons 
1.100 euro fine, 
alternatively 20 
days imprisonment 
Police colleague 
observed weapons in 
police officer's locker at 
the police station 
16 Hitting car driver with a Maglite 
flashlight after stopping a 
suspected car 
Resistance from the 
driver 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
No 
17 Drinking heavily the night 
before early police duty at 
police station and driving 
police car from his home to the 
police station intoxicated 
Was in the process of 
a complicated 
divorce from his ex-
wife 
21 days 
imprisonment and 
12,000 euro fine 
When arriving at work, 
colleagues noticed the 
alcohol smell and 
reported it to a 
supervisor 
18 His wife was to employ a 
person who turned out to be a 
convict 
Wanted to help his 
wife in her business 
of employing 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
No 
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personnel 
19 Helped illegal immigrant to 
Norway 
The illegal immigrant 
was her sister 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
Police colleague 
noticed similarity in 
names of illegal 
immigrant sister 
20 Did not help seriously injured 
person in a park 
Thought the person 
was drunk or 
intoxicated 
No sentence, case 
dismissed 
No 
21 Told his father about an 
employed person in his church 
that was suspected of rape 
Wanted to help his 
father and his church 
900 euro fine, 
alternatively ten 
days imprisonment 
No 
Table 1: Court cases in Norway in 2008 focusing on the whistle blowing cases. 
 
This paper opens up several avenues for future research. First, both theoretical and 
methodological foundations of such studies might be improved. This is particularly important 
for future studies into the presented matrix. Secondly, similar studies from other sectors of 
crime might be compared to the rotten-apple versus rotten-barrel metaphor. Also, practical 
implications of these different attitudes and perceptions might be explored. 
 
Conclusion 
Two empirical studies are compared in this paper. First, 141 CFOs responded to questions 
about white-collar crime. A vast majority estimated here to be two-thirds suggested rotten 
apples, while only one-third suggested rotten barrels in cases of white-collar crime. Next, 57 
court cases dealing with police employees were studied. A majority of 33 versus 25 cases 
indicate rotten rotten barrels versus rotten apples. Therefore, both studies indicate that the 
perception by CFOs and judges is the same, i.e. a typical white-collar crime and a typical 
police crime is committed because of individual failure rather than systems failure.  
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